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‘PAYING THE PRICE’: IMPACT ON SUBORDINATE POTENTIAL AND
EXPECTATIONS IN THE NEW BUREAUCRACY
Abstract
It is argued that many types of bureaucratic reform have entailed an extension or
intensification of, not a departure from, bureaucratic control. This paper reports the
findings of a qualitative case study which examines the impact of ‘new bureaucratic’
structures and systems on the performance and expectations of organisational
subordinates. Such subordinates question the ‘price’ that has to be paid by themselves
to achieve strategic visions devised and implemented by remote and faceless senior
executives. This price is reflected in subordinates’ perceptions of the extent to which
‘cleaned-up’ bureaucratic processes impact on the achievement of their overall
potential. Subordinates place emphasis on their immediate managers to act as a shield
to protect them from the more extreme measures devised by senior executives. Such
shielding strategies were found to comprise elements of directly ‘supporting’
subordinates as well as ‘softening’ the more negative aspects of the organisational
environment.
Key words: cleaned-up bureaucracy; organisational change; subordinate expectations
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This paper reports the findings of a qualitative case study which examines the impact
of ‘new bureaucratic’ structures and systems on the performance and expectations of
organisational subordinates. Critical studies of recent attempts to restructure
bureaucracies (Cornfield, Campbell, & McCammon, 2001; Courpasson, 2000; Hales,
2002; Rees & Rodley, 1995; Stokes & Clegg, 2002; Thompson & Warhurst, 1998)
suggest that many types of bureaucratic reform have entailed an extension or
intensification of, not a departure from, bureaucratic control (Alvesson, 1995; Hilmer
& Donaldson, 1996; Whittington & Mayer, 2000). It is argued that bureaucratic
reform often entails changes within the basic bureaucratic model rather than
paradigmatic shifts to radically new organizational forms (Hales, 2002). The end
result is not a de-bureaucratized organization but a cleaned-up bureaucracy
(Heckscher, 1994). Hales (2002: 52) maintains that many bureaucratic reforms retain
‘the defining features of bureaucracy – hierarchical control, centrally imposed rules,
and individual managerial responsibility and accountability’. The result is an
attenuated and more efficient version of bureaucracy – ‘bureaucracy-lite’ – which
possesses ‘all the strength of bureaucratic control but with only half of the
hierarchical calories’ (ibid: 64). The end result is not an alternative to, but an
alternative version of, bureaucratic organization. Bureaucracy-lite seeks to ‘retain
tight control over managers’ behaviour through the combination of rules and vertical
reporting relationships, while reducing the size and cost of the hierarchy’ (ibid: 62).
Subordinates in cleaned-up bureaucracies thus frequently experience greater
powerlessness than members of unreconstituted bureaucracies, despite the emphasis
in the latter on hierarchical command and control techniques, extensive formalisation,
technical narrowness, jurisdictional delimitation, and standardized procedures. It is
well known that in Western-style economies, public sector and private sector
bureaucracies, in their post-war incarnation, frequently afforded members informal
power resources and discretion based on, for example, control of ‘areas of
uncertainty’ (Crozier, 1964: 172), inconsistent or indulgent application of rules
(Gouldner, 1964), and unofficial procedural adjustments aimed at avoiding perceived
dysfunctional aspects of official procedures (Blau, 1963). The project of cleaning-up a
bureaucracy entails removing the organisational and managerial slack that sustains
these unofficial practices, further codifying performance expectations and invigilating
work, while simultaneously fostering a micro-political centralization within the
organization (Courpasson, 2000).
Indeed, the restoration and legitimation of managerial prerogatives under the guise of
an allegedly new approach to labour management (Buchanan, 1995) is a prevalent
theme in the critical literature. Efforts to clean up bureaucracies provide the
opportunity to (re)assert managerial control over how work is performed. Duncan
(1995: 167) argues that the era of managerialism or neo-Taylorism is aimed at
producing top-down performance control models in which managerialist techniques
‘increase rather than decrease bureaucratic control over subordinates while
empowering senior managers’. Subordinates lose a degree of both professional
autonomy and security of employment conditions (Duncan, 1995; Sennett, 1998). The
effects of such changes are felt just as much by middle-to-lower level managers as
they are by those in non-managerial positions (Mulholland, 1998; Thomas &
Dunkerley, 1999; Thomas & Linstead, 2002). The term ‘bright satanic offices’ was
coined by Baldry, Bain & Taylor (1998: 172) to describe organizations obsessed with
performance targets and output measurement, which senior managers use to drive the
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process of increasing the volume, speed and intensity of programmed work. The
discipline of achieving tight performance criteria is enforced by middle and lower
managers who respond to such control by more stringent ‘micro-management of their
units and subordinates’ (Hales, 2002: 61). Surveillance, monitoring and panoptic gaze
are utilized to keep subordinates continuously observed and controlled (Sewell &
Wilkinson, 1992). Post-bureaucratic initiatives such as quality assurance and total
quality management are also regarded by Taylor (1998) as widespread forms of
organizational restructuring where management attempts to control and regulate its
subordinates.
Other post-bureaucratic initiatives have attempted to introduce the market system into
bureaucracies with the intention of fostering entrepreneurial behaviour (Halal, 1994)
through such measures as the formation of business units, increased use of
subcontractors, and the creation of functional groups that sell their products or
services to internal customers. Such internal markets, however, tend to be far from
unfettered. They are usually heavily structured by senior management and preserve
the essential ingredient of bureaucracy, which is the ‘separation of members into
sharply discrete parts brought together only at the top’ (Heckscher, 1994: 34).
Initiatives such as purchaser-provider restructures, and their associated competitive
tendering activities, afford senior managers more control over contract employees
‘who can easily be sacked or replaced if they question decisions or challenge
authority’ (Albin, 1995: 141). The rise of a bloated managerial class under a
purchaser-provider structure, with the ubiquitous presence of ‘men in suits’ and ‘tickbox charlies’ (Jones, 2000: 24-25), the progressive centralization of authority and
decision-making (Face, 1995) and the creation of an unaccountable and personally
politicized elite (Stokes & Clegg, 2002), contrast sharply with the image of a feeling
of powerlessness among staff (Face, 1995) and a demoralized workforce (Stokes &
Clegg, 2002), performing contracted, prescriptive, deskilled, and tightly controlled
and measured tasks in a bland atmosphere of compliance, uniformity and
standardization (Jones, 2000). Such is the reality of doing more with less (Rees &
Rodley, 1995).
CASE STUDY ORGANISATION AND METHODOLOGY
The case involves a public sector organization (pseudonym AGRO) situated in an
eastern state of Australia. A public sector organization was regarded as highly suitable
for such a study following the argument of Warhurst and Thompson (1998) that such
organizations have become more bureaucratized as control by professionals has given
way to tighter managerial control. The organization’s purpose stems from the early
1900s when roads and bridges were first constructed and drivers and their vehicles
first licensed. It evolved during the mid-1900s as two separate state government
departments, one of which managed roads, and the other managed driver and vehicle
licensing. These functions were combined under one government organization in
1989, AGRO.
Thus, AGRO’s culture has developed for almost a century within the context of a
hierarchical, bureaucratic government department managed by engineers. AGRO is a
complex organization with regard to a number of factors, such as functions, size,
dispersion, and hierarchy. It is responsible for the development of the national and
state road networks, managing traffic flow, promotion of road safety and traffic
regulations, licensing drivers, and the registration of vehicles in its state. The
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organization maintains over 20,000 kilometres of roads, over 4,000 bridges, ferries,
and countless traffic lights, roundabouts and road signs. Its total annual roads
programme expenditure is approximately US$1.4 billion. It licenses over four million
drivers and registers their vehicles, processing 75,000 registration and licensing
transactions per day. AGRO employed almost 6,500 full-time staff in 2002, spread
throughout offices and depots in more than 200 locations in its state. It is structured
according to nine separate business functions. In turn these functions are clustered
into four overarching organizational categories – corporate support, funder, purchaser,
and provider. There are ten levels in the AGRO hierarchy from the CEO down to the
roadwork labourer.
AGRO operates in a strong political environment, which considerably constrains CEO
discretion. When AGRO was first established as a merged organization in 1989 it
enjoyed a decentralized structure of five regions, each with its own regional director.
Each region had a high degree of autonomy, managing many of its own functions,
including human resources (HR), and being able to develop a high degree of
flexibility and performance achievement to distinguish itself from neighbouring
regions. Politically this accorded with the state government’s decentralization agenda
of the early 1990s, which encouraged development of remote locations to create nonmetropolitan employment.
Data was obtained through 25 tape-recorded and transcribed interviews conducted
with a range of AGRO subordinates over the period 2000-2002. Eleven of the
interviewees held no formal power-holding positions, whilst the remaining fourteen
occupied lower and middle management positions. The authors collected and
analysed the data through an emergent methodology in conjunction with line-by-line
coding, category construction, and the use of theoretical sampling to pursue important
themes as they emerged (Glaser, 1998).
CLEANING-UP PROCESS
The cleaning-up process within AGRO has been executed in an incremental and serial
manner since the mid 1990s and is still continuing. The outer context (Pettigrew,
1987) for the changes comprises governmental demands for increased accountability
in public service provision, which has been operationalised within an inner
context that comprises four major components of the cleaning-up process:
centralization, policy deployment, TQM codification, and the purchaser-provider
contract culture. Political accountability has thus been strongly, if not exclusively, led
by considerations of financial efficiency and by cost-related numerical performance
targets (du Gay, 2000). At the same time as these developments have been activated
they have translated into on-going impacts on the roles and expectations of individual
subordinates within AGRO.
Centralisation constituted the initial strategy in the cleaning-up process, and acted to
reverse the previous emphasis on decentralisation and autonomy. Due to strong
external political pressure, with demands for a refocusing on core business and more
central accountability and control, a new CEO was appointed (who quickly acquired
the nickname ‘the axe’). Regional autonomy was progressively dismantled and major
functions were centralized and standardized. In particular, the HR function was
centralized within a powerful Corporate Services division at Head Office and
provided the focus for a standardized set of HR and other strategies and programmes
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to be established. The primary goal of such programmes was focused on financial
performance and efficiency – better ways of doing the job, reducing waste and saving
money. Thus, centralization removed the flexibility and discretion of those
subordinates who had previously served the needs of independent regions. Instead,
they now found themselves beholden to standardized policies, owned and enforced
‘from on high’ by newly-empowered senior executives. Such executives were placed
on short-term performance-based contracts, and under a regime of ‘policy
deployment’ they cascaded goals, objectives and targets downwards through the
hierarchy. Codification and monitoring, in the guise of ‘best practice’ procedures,
became the order of the day. Accordingly, subordinates found themselves ‘looking
upwards’ to meet the needs and performance objectives of senior managers rather
than ‘looking outwards’ to meet the needs and requirements of customers. Fitting in,
following orders, meeting targets, and ‘making your boss look good’ constituted key
elements of the new bureaucratic culture.
At this point in the process, enter TQM as a further weapon in the incremental and
serial cleaning-up agenda. TQM had previously been introduced in 1992 and had
originally been used as an empowerment, problem-solving, and improvement
mechanism, employing such techniques as quality circles, process mapping,
Australian Quality Awards assessments, and continuous improvement. However, its
usefulness as an integral part of the cleaning-up process was soon realised, and the
concept was quickly commandeered, adapted, and consequently abused in its new role
as a control and systematization tool. TQM, thus redefined, fitted in well with, and
reinforced, the evolving codification and invigilation culture at AGRO. This became
increasingly evident as AGRO moved on to the next and latest progression in the
cleaning-up agenda, that of instituting a contract, purchaser-provider culture. An
embryonic funder-provider split was commenced in 1995 which by 2001 had
crystallized into a definite funder-purchaser-provider demarcation. Service level
agreements and competitive tendering have imposed a rigid cost and efficiency
perspective on internal operations staff since 1999. A certain core of work is still
guaranteed to internal staff under a preferred supplier status, but most work is now
subject to competitive tendering. To support this development, the latest reincarnation
of TQM has evolved to an emphasis on ‘quality plans’. These set out all the basic
activities that ensure that projects will be completed ‘to standard’. Quality,
environment, and safety issues are all combined into integrated system plans that
become an integral part of the bidding and operations cultures. Outcomes are assessed
and measured according to tight performance criteria. Thus, the contract-TQM
partnership has acted to reinforce the already strong emphasis placed on the concepts
of monitoring, codification, standardization, and prescription, whilst simultaneously
locating these measures within a new and powerful cultural environment dominated
by work intensification, job insecurity and cost minimisation.
IMPACT ON SUBORDINATES
In general, we found that AGRO subordinates did not question the overall vision of
the organisation to achieve greater competitiveness, efficiency and productivity. On
the contrary, they wanted the organisation to survive and prosper. What they did
question was the “price” that had to be paid by subordinates to achieve a strategic
vision that had been devised and implemented by “remote and faceless” senior
executives. ‘Disempowerment’ and ‘powerlessness’ were common themes raised by
our respondents as the cleaning-up process had acted to remove the informal power
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resources, discretion and control exercised by subordinates in the original AGRO. In
particular, the cleaning-up process had acted to break the nexus between subordinates’
perception of their potential and their perception of their current reality. Most
subordinates expect to perform at, or approaching, their full potential. However, we
found that the cleaning-up process had a significant impact on the roles and
expectations of subordinates with respect to their perceptions of the extent to which
they believed that their potential was being fully realised within this tightened-up
bureaucratic culture. In particular, we found that the cleaning-up process had created
two distinct types of subordinates – those who were ‘limited’ (operating below their
perception of their potential), and those who were ‘overloaded’ (operating above their
perception of their potential). Such subordinates tend to experience certain familiar
negative emotions and act out a range of detrimental behavioural patterns.
Some examples taken from our research will make these concepts clearer. Linda (a
training manager) is a limited subordinate. Previously she enjoyed a good deal of
discretion in her role. With specific responsibilities within a defined region she was
responsible for conducting needs analyses and devising and delivering custom-made
programmes to meet the flexible requirements of independent regions. Her role was
extremely customer focused. However, centralisation and standardisation of training
programmes robbed her of much of the discretion and flexibility in her job. She now
finds her job to involve higher levels of prescription and she is far more beholden to
the dictates of her (inaccessible) senior management than she ever was. She has lost
her close contact with customers and finds herself unable to respond to their needs
through her own discretion. As a result, Linda finds herself “less challenged” by her
job and is unable to “exact anything from it”. Her frustration has led to a loss of “that
feeling of affection” for the organisation and a consequent “lack of loyalty” to AGRO.
Vera (a service delivery crew member) has also been limited by the cleaning-up
process. Under the new contract culture her crew can only provide services for which
it is being paid. Since the crew must now account for all its time and costs it can no
longer provide any extra form of assistance, as it had done in the past, to other crews
or carry out any task not listed on its work order. For Vera, this has created an
“adversarial model”. This, for her, “destroys the notion of a supportive attitude and
the concept of acting as one organisation” and has the consequence of “killing the
desire to do a good job” amongst crew members.
John (a contracts administrator) is an overloaded subordinate. The transition to
cleaned-up status in AGRO created a range of new jobs and opportunities that had not
existed in the original bureaucratic form. Examples include jobs in quality
management, performance planning, and contracts management. People were often
moved into these positions from other areas of the organisation. John is one of these
people. With the transition to a contract culture he was moved from the slimmeddown ‘operations’ area to the expanding ‘purchaser’ side of AGRO. John considers
himself to be a “hands on” person. He now believes himself to be “out of my comfort
zone”. He states he has “no aptitude” for the job and has received inadequate training.
His manager continually “hovers over me” pointing out his mistakes. He feels underresourced, vulnerable and exposed. John’s hands trembled as he spoke to the
researcher. He was considering leaving the organisation and working for his brother.
But his options were very restricted, “at 48 years of age I don’t have a lot of choice”.
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Linda, Vera and John harbour resentment towards AGRO. They openly blame the
organisation for creating their predicament. All three of them want to be ‘unleashed’.
Unleashed subordinates enjoy an ‘attainment equilibrium’ wherein they perceive
themselves as having achieved their potential, or else as making adequate progress
towards reaching their potential. Linda, Vera and John previously enjoyed such status.
They describe themselves as previously experiencing such emotions as fulfilment,
satisfaction, commitment, enthusiasm, excitement and meaningfulness. In
consequence they “looked forward to their work” and acted out such typical
behaviours as displaying effort, being creative, exhibiting cooperativeness, and
showing a general willingness to “go the extra mile”. However, the cleaning-up
process has robbed them of these emotions and behaviours.
We found that since AGRO subordinates believe that the organisation is responsible
for creating their problem, it should also assume responsibility for the solution. But
how can such an organisation help, and respond to the needs of, limited and
overloaded subordinates? In general, subordinates looked to their more immediate
supervisors and managers to reduce the ‘price’ that they had to pay and direct them
towards regaining a new ‘unleashed’ status. They expected immediate managers to act
as a ‘shield’ to protect them from the more extreme measures devised by senior
executives. The process of shielding is comprised of two separate actions (using invovo codes of respondents), namely “supporting us as individuals” and “softening the
blow”.
‘Subordinate-supporting strategies’ are those which offer assistance and
encouragement to subordinates within an overall caring context. Steve describes this
as being “nice to know management is on your side”. Such strategies aim to develop
the knowledge, abilities, skills and attitudes of subordinates. Our interviews contained
four main categories of such strategies: ‘team involvement’ (to develop skills
revolving around ownership, partnership, and making a contribution), ‘skills
enhancement’ (through formal training, work experience, or learning opportunities),
‘positive guidance’ (such as feedback, mentoring, and confidence building), and ‘help
and affirmation’ (such as assistance, listening, and giving credit). Subordinates were
invariably drawn to managers who displayed honesty, credibility, trustworthiness and
integrity. Our interviews were liberally sprinkled with comments about managers who
“will not lie to us”, or were “straight down the middle”.
‘Environment-softening strategies’ are those which aim at mitigating the constraining
effect of the cleaned-up work environment as it impacts on subordinates’
performance. Although subordinates hold corporate executives responsible for
creating the cleaned-up work environment, they expect their immediate managers to
mitigate the adverse consequences as they impact on them. We found that both
limited and overloaded subordinates expect such managers to continually display such
‘softening’ initiatives by utilizing such approaches as job transfers, re-designing jobs
and processes, reducing communication barriers, and establishing additional structural
integrational mechanisms.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we have examined the case of AGRO (a typical government bureaucracy
in an eastern Australian state) that has undergone a cleaning-up process involving four
major components since the mid-1990s: centralisation, policy deployment, TQM
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codification, and a purchaser-provider contract culture. We have argued that these
reforms have merely created an attenuated and more efficient version of bureaucracy
(Hales, 2002). Subordinate expectations in this environment place emphasis on the
importance of ‘shielding’ processes on the part of their more immediate managers to
mitigate the excesses of senior executives’ policy making within the cleaned-up
bureaucratic context characterised by increased subordinate powerlessness.
We have argued that bureaucracy in its cleaned-up version exacerbates the tendency
of this form of organization to disempower subordinates. We have previously noted
how post-war Western bureaucracies in their unreconstituted state, frequently
afforded subordinates informal power resources and discretion based on inconsistent
or indulgent application of rules, and control over certain areas of uncertainty.
However, the process of cleaning-up bureaucracies acts to remove the managerial
slack that sustains such practices. Ironically, the change sequences which act to move
subordinates into this scenario of increased threat and survival are often hidden within
the guise of such processes as ‘quality’ and ‘empowerment’ – as was the case at
AGRO. Feelings of increased powerlessness influence the manner in which
subordinates consider their possible selves, in terms of closing the gap between their
potential and their actual reality. We have argued that the cleaning-up process further
removes what little control subordinates had in the old bureaucracies to assume
personal responsibility for reaching their potential. In effect, subordinates can suffer
from a form of ‘learned helplessness’ (Seligman, 1993), a condition whereby
individuals often find themselves unable to help, or look after, themselves. Individuals
who are often inclined to feel lost within (or downtrodden by) the system realize that
through their own efforts they are severely constrained in their attempts to close the
gap between their actual and potential self-states. The learned helplessness of the
cleaned-up bureaucratic subordinate can help to explain the reliance of such
individuals on their more immediate organizational managers to play a crucial role in
helping them to reach their overall potential.
Our findings reveal the paradoxical role occupied by lower and middle managers in
the cleaned-up bureaucracy. On the one hand they are expected to exercise strong
control over subordinates in order to achieve the specific ‘policy-deployed’ goals,
objectives and targets mandated by senior executives, whilst on the other hand they
are expected by their subordinates to employ supportive and softening counter
measures to shield them from the adverse effect of such policies as they impact on
subordinates from ‘on high’.
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